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Abstract
IPO underpricing harms pre-existing shareholders and reduces the capital firms can raise to fund
their growth. This paper shows that relationship banking can reduce IPO underpricing by decreasing
information uncertainty. I develop a theoretical model showing that good firms – those with a lower
dispersion of market value – are harmed and bad firms benefit from IPO price uncertainty when there is
no borrowing and, thus, no distinguishing information on firm quality. When investors receive signals
about firm value only from publicly observable transaction lending, good firms benefit while bad firms
suffer. However, when firms have access to loans through relationship banks and when such lending
decisions are kept confidential, firms experience reduced IPO price uncertainty, which benefits both
good and bad firms. I confirm this result empirically through difference-in-differences and reduced
form instrumental variable regression designs. I use variation in the strength of the lending relationship
between IPO firms and their underwriters generated by the repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act in 1999,
which allowed commercial banks with close ties to their client firms to underwrite those firms’ equity
issuances.
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1 Introduction
This paper investigates whether relationship banking can help reduce IPO underpricing. Previous literature
relates IPO underpricing to information asymmetry (Allen and Faulhaber, 1989; Benveniste and Spindt,
1989; Benveniste and Wilhelm, 1990; Grinblatt and Hwang, 1989; Rock, 1986). If this is true, then relation-
ship banking, which reduces both the information asymmetry between the firm and the underwriter and the
information asymmetry between the firm and investors, should limit IPO underpricing.
The phenomenon of IPO underpricing has important consequences for financial markets. Underpricing
harms pre-IPO shareholders because they receive lower proceeds from the IPO and reduces the capital raised
in the IPO, which firms need to reinvest and grow. Over the last 50 years, IPOs in the United States have
been underpriced by 16.8% on average. This translates to more than $125 billion left on the table in just the
last 20 years. IPO underpricing plagues markets worldwide. In Britain, the average IPO was underpriced
by 16.3% in the period ranging from 1959 to 2009. In most other countries, average IPO underpricing now
exceeds 20%. In China, the phenomenon is particularly severe, averaging 137.4% from 1990 to 2010.1
The prevalence of such astronomical IPO underpricing motivates this study. Previous research identifies
information asymmetry as one of the key potential drivers of underpricing. I propose that there maybe a
fixable-mechanism underlying this information asymmetry: the strength and nature of the relationship be-
tween the underwriter and the firm. In particular, I posit that relationship banking reduces the underwriter’s
and investors’ uncertainty about the true value of the firm and, thus, generates more accurate IPO prices.
I theoretically document, how this mechanism could affect firms of varying quality. Then, I empirically
measure the portion of IPO underpricing that can be attributed to the absence of relationship banking.
There is some support in the literature for my theory that relationship banking offers a solution to
IPO underpricing. Boot and Thakor (2000) illuminate the role of relationship banking from a theoretical
standpoint. They argue that a relationship loan adds more value for the firm, but also imposes a greater cost,
because a relationship bank must develop costly expertise (sector specialization) in order to add value. Thus,
a relationship bank will generally understand the quality of the client firm better than a non-relationship
bank. While these findings are related to my research, this paper is the first to study whether relationship
banking can reduce the underpricing of IPOs.
First, I develop a theoretical model to address this question. This model distinguishes between two
types of firms with the same expected value. Good firms, G, have a low dispersion of market value; their
IPO offer proceeds is denoted by OPG. Bad firms, B, have a high dispersion of market value; their offer
1“Strategic Financial Management Casebook” by Rajesh Kumar
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proceeds is denoted by OPB. Firm owners know their firm type, but don’t know the firm’s market value.
The theoretical analysis predicts that, when there is no borrowing, uninformed investors cannot distinguish
between the two types of firms. In this case, the offer proceeds (OPP) are the same for both types of
firms (OPB < OPP < OPG). If their types were known, good firms would receive higher proceeds and bad
firms would receive lower proceeds. Because uninformed investors face greater adverse selection risk in
purchasing shares of bad firms and require greater underpricing to compensate for this risk (Beatty and
Ritter, 1986). Thus, when firm types are unknown, good firms suffer and bad firms benefit. When we
allow for publicly observable transaction lending (but not relationship lending), the outcomes may remain
the same, as uninformed investors cannot reliably distinguish between good and bad firms by looking at
whether the firm borrows. Even if they could identify the two types of firms, the bad firm would still be
worse off, receiving lower offer proceeds than in the pooling case. In contrast, when relationship lending is
available and lending decisions are confidential, IPO underpricing is reduced and the bad firm is better off,
receiving higher offer proceeds than in the previous two cases.
The intuition behind these results follows from the existence of two levels of information asymmetry.
First, there is information asymmetry between the firm and its investors. Second, there is information
asymmetry between the firm and its underwriter. In my model, the first level of information asymmetry is
reduced because the presence of relationship banking allows for a separating equilibrium in which bad firms
borrow and good firms raise capital directly from equity markets. This leads to reduced underpricing for all
IPO firms. The second level of information asymmetry is reduced because the underwriter is comparatively
better informed through the process of relationship lending than other uninformed underwriters. This leads
to more substantial reduction in IPO underpricing for firms that have a relationship bank as the underwriter
than other firms.
Boot and Thakor (2000) show that the incremental benefit of a relationship loan is decreasing in firm
quality. This result is driven by two facts: (i) banks can increase the project payoff more substantially for a
bad firm than for a good firm; and (ii) it costs the bank more to provide a relationship loan than to provide
a transaction loan, that is, a cost S is incurred for relationship loans. Because S is independent of firm
quality but the benefit is decreasing in firm quality, at a sufficiently high quality, the cost of a relationship
loan exceeds its marginal benefit. Boot and Thakor (2000) conceptualize a cutoff level such that the bank
prefers to provide relationship loans to the firms below the cutoff and transaction loans to the firms above
the cutoff. Following this idea, in my paper, the bank makes relationship loans to bad firms (high dispersion)
and transaction loans to good firms (low dispersion). At the same time, the firm’s expected cost of capital
market funding is decreasing in firm quality; thus, the bank’s rents on a transaction loan decline as firm
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quality improves, since the competition bank faces from the capital market is greater for higher-quality
firms. Boot and Thakor (2000) propose another cutoff – the level of firm quality at which the bank’s rent on
transaction loans becomes zero (and above which the rent becomes negative). These highest-quality firms
rely on the capital market for funding.
Thus, this paper assumes that good firms forgo bank loans and go directly to the capital market, while
bad firms’ higher expected cost of capital market funding prevents them from doing the same. This allows
uninformed investors to distinguish between the two types of firms: good firms go directly to the capital mar-
ket without borrowing while bad firms borrow.2 Thus, the second level of information asymmetry is reduced.
Consequently, IPOs are priced more accurately because uninformed investors do not require underpricing
as compensation for risk3 and investment banks do not need to compensate informed investors (institutional
investors) for revealing information about the firm by offering a higher allocation of underpriced shares.4
Through this theoretical model, I form three testable predictions: (1) relationship banking can reduce
IPO underpricing for all firms that go public, regardless of the strength of their relationships with their
underwriters; (2) firms that have a relationship bank experience a larger reductions in IPO underpricing
compared to other firms; (3) relationship banking reduces information asymmetry between the underwriter
and the firm as well as between the firm and investors. Confirmation of these three predictions would imply
that relationship banking reduces IPO underpricing by limiting information uncertainty.
My empirical strategy for testing these predictions relies on changes to the rules governing IPO under-
writing. With the repeal of the Glass–Steagall Act on November 12, 1999, commercial banks with close ties
to their client firms gained permission to underwrite those firms’ equity issuances.5 A close lending rela-
tionship almost necessarily entails a more detailed understanding on the part of the bank of the quality of the
client firm. In contrast, underwriters that are comparatively uninformed about IPO client quality potentially
send more noisy signals to investors about prices. When a relationship bank lends to a firm, it obtains propri-
etary, firm-specific information that cannot be easily and credibly conveyed to others (Schenone, 2004). The
1999 repeal of the Glass–Steagall Act allows me to compare IPO underpricing before and after commercial
banks were allowed to underwrite their client firms’ IPOs through a difference-in-differences design. Firms
with an IPO underwriter that is not a relationship bank are designated as control firms. Treated firms have
2I assume that bad firms receive only relationship loans, which are not publicly observable like transaction loans; however,
uninformed investors can still distinguish bad firms from good ones because only bad firms borrow.
3IPO underpricing can be thought of as compensation for the uninformed investors, as illustrated in previous studies such as
Allen and Faulhaber, 1989; Benveniste and Spindt, 1989; Benveniste and Wilhelm, 1990; Grinblatt and Hwang, 1989; Rock, 1986.
4Cornelli and Goldreich, 2001; Cornelli and Goldreich, 2003 and Aggarwal et al., 2002 find evidence that investment banks
compensate informed investors (institutional investors) for revealing information about the firm by offering a higher allocation of
underpriced shares.
5Between 1998 and 1999, commercial banks could manage client firms’ IPOs only indirectly through the bank’s Section 20
subsidiary. Since 1999, commercial banks have been able to directly underwrite IPOs.
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an IPO underwriter that is a relationship bank.
This empirical approach could produce biased estimates if firms self-select into treatment (i.e., choose
to use relationship banks as underwriters) for unobserved reasons. For example, certain firms may have
reason to believe that being underwritten by their relationship banks would benefit them. This selection
issue may generate a significant difference in underpricing between treated and control firms even if, on
average, there is no effect of underwriter’s choice on underpricing.6 To address possible selection bias,
I employ a reduced form instrumental variable (IV) approach. Instead of defining treated firms as firms
with IPO underwriters that are relationship banks, I use as an instrument for treatment IPO firms that had
relationship banks before their IPO. Such firms should be more likely to choose a relationship bank as their
IPO underwriter for convenience reasons rather than for reasons related to their beliefs about IPO pricing.
To the extent that selection of a relationship bank at least three years before an IPO is likely exogenous
to the IPO decision, selection into treatment should be exogenous to IPO prices. All other IPO firms are
considered control firms.7
Since the theoretical model implies that only bad firms (treated firms) borrow, good firms (control firms)
go directly to the capital market. Following this logic, all IPO firms are good firms. However, after bad firms
receive relationship loans, their project payoffs (and consequently their quality) are improved through the
relationship banks’ sector specialization. Thus, these bad firms can later tap the capital market at a lower
cost than would have been otherwise possible, since a firm’s expected cost of capital market funding is
decreasing in firm quality.
My results are as follows. First, I find that IPO underpricing is reduced for all firms after the repeal of
the Glass–Steagall Act. This is indicative of a link between allowing relationship banks to underwrite client
firms’ IPOs and more accurate IPO pricing. As further evidence, between the two periods, underpricing
for the treated group fell by 6.5 more percentage points relative to the change for the control group, after
controlling for other determinants of IPO underpricing. Additional analyses on the changes in the outcome
variable and control variables (including the levels of macroeconomic variables) over time reinforce my
interpretation of the effect of relationship banking on IPO underpricing. While this evidence is indicative, it
is not necessarily causal.
I employ the propensity score matching method to obtain control firms that are similar to the treated
firms as a robustness check. I also include the dot-com bubble of 1998-2000 in the sample period as a second
robustness check. In both cases, the results are consistent with my original findings.
6This scenario would likely bias my estimate of the effect of relationship banking on IPO prices upward, possibly generating a
statistically positive coefficient when the true relationship is null or even negative.
7In the theoretical model, treated firms are bad firms and control firms are good firms.
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If the degree of underpricing is related to the amount of uncertainty the underwriter and the investors
have about the true value of the firm, then I should find that relationship banking reduces this uncertainty
and, hence, reduces the underpricing. To demonstrate a causal relationship between information asymme-
try and the reduction in IPO underpricing, I employ a triple difference-in-differences approach. I use the
average standard deviation of daily returns over the sample period for all firms in the same industry as the
firm pursuing an IPO as the proxy for information asymmetry. It is reasonable to assume that, during the
sample period, firms in higher-volatility industries are in general more opaque than firms in lower-volatility
industries. I find that, between the two periods, underpricing for treated firms with higher information uncer-
tainty fell by 3.3 more percentage points relative to the change in underpricing for more transparent treated
firms. This indicates that firms facing higher information asymmetry problems experience less underpric-
ing because of relationship banking, supporting my argument that relationship banking reduces information
asymmetry, which in turn affects the degree of underpricing.
My findings make two key contributions to the literature. First, my findings contribute to the strand of
literature on IPO underpricing. Prior studies have largely focused on identifying the underlying causes of
IPO underpricing, whereas I both confirm the causes and suggest a new possible solution that is superior to
the few that have been written about in the past. There is an extensive literature claiming that asymmetric
information causes IPO underpricing from a theoretical standpoint (see, for example Allen and Faulhaber,
1989; Benveniste and Spindt, 1989; Benveniste and Wilhelm, 1990; Grinblatt and Hwang, 1989 and Rock,
1986). These studies argue that, when a firm goes public, the investors and the firm are asymmetrically
informed about that firm’s true value. Thus, IPO underpricing can be thought of as compensation for the
uninformed investors. From informed investors’ perspective, Cornelli and Goldreich (2001), Cornelli and
Goldreich (2003) and Aggarwal et al. (2002) find evidence that investment banks compensate informed in-
vestors (institutional investors) for revealing information about the firm by offering a higher allocation of
underpriced shares. James and Wier (1990) is the first paper in the literature that offers a solution for reduc-
ing IPO underpricing. James and Wier (1990) point out that issuing private debt before an IPO is a signal
to the market of high value, since only high-value firms will be approved for loans. The authors’ hypothesis
is that this signal reduces asymmetric information, thus lowering IPO underpricing for firms with private
debt before an IPO. More recently, Schenone (2004) propose a solution that uses banking relationships8
established before the firm’s IPO to reduce the information asymmetry behind high IPO underpricing. The
solutions proposed by James and Wier (1990) and Schenone (2004) only reduce IPO underpricing for certain
8This paper defines a banking relationship as any situation where an IPO underwriter has previously made a loan to the firm
pursuing IPO. This definition is different from my definition of relationship banking.
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treated firms while hurting firms with a higher dispersion of market value by exposing them as bad firms. In
contrast, my solution to the information asymmetry problem reduces IPO underpricing for all firms and, at
the same time, benefits firms with a higher dispersion of market value. Second, my findings contribute to the
strand of literature on relationship banking (Boot and Thakor, 2000; Gopalan et al., 2011). A large literature
in banking argues that banks help overcome information and agency problems. This literature has typically
settled on identifying the benefits of lending relationships in loan terms. An innovation of my work is to test
for the benefits of lending relationships in the IPO market.
My findings also have implications for financial policy going forward. In recent years, demands have
persisted to bring back Glass-Steagall because some people believe that commercial banks’ engagement in
investment banking caused the financial crisis of 2007-2008. The Republican Party’s official 2016 platform
called for it. So did the 2016 Democratic Party platform. Whether a restoration of Glass-Steagall would
prevent another collapse is up for debate. My findings suggest that bring back Glass-Steagall has very real
costs of hurting IPO firms. By allowing relationship banks to underwrite their client firms’ equity issuances,
financial regulators can help IPO firms receive more proceeds to reinvest and grow and especially help firms
with a high dispersion of market value, as relationship banks can offer these firms a lower cost of capital.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 is literature review, Section 3 presents a theo-
retical analysis of the effect of relationship banking on IPO underpricing, Section 4 presents the empirical
analysis of the theoretical model in Section 3, and Section 5 concludes.
2 Literature Review
My paper is related to the literature that discusses relationship banking from both theoretical and empirical
perspectives. In my theoretical model, I use the definition for relationship loans introduced in Boot and
Thakor (2000): a loan that permits the bank to use its expertise to improve the firm’s project payoff. The
extent of the payoff improvement depends on the bank’s sector-specific expertise. Through this sector
specialization, a relationship bank almost certainly determines the true market value of the client firm. I also
use Boot and Thakor (2000) payoff structure for firms with relationship banks. In the empirical analysis, I
use Gopalan et al. (2011) definition for relationship bank as a lead bank of any prior syndicated loan to the
client firm that had ever lent to this firm in the past. Gopalan et al. (2011) finds that firms form new banking
relationships to expand their access to credit and capital market services. This corresponds to my argument
that a bad firm benefits from improved project payoffs after receiving a relationship loan due to relationship
bank’s sector specialization, ultimately lowering its cost of capital in the capital market.
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My theoretical model builds on the model in James and Wier (1990), with four key distinctions. First,
since James and Wier (1990) assume an uninformed underwriter, the information asymmetry between the
firm and the underwriter in their model is reduced to a lesser extent relative to my model, where the under-
writer is informed. Second, the signal that investors observe in James and Wier (1990) model is noisier than
the corresponding signal in my model.9 Thus, the information asymmetry between the firm and investors is
also reduced to a lesser extent in James and Wier (1990) model. Third, James and Wier (1990) model only
reduces IPO underpricing for good firms. My model reduces both types of firms’ IPO underpricing. Fourth,
bad firms are better off in my model since they receive higher proceeds when they go to the capital market.
Schenone (2004) is the only paper of which I am aware that examines IPO underpricing through the
pre-IPO banking relationship after the repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act. Her study compares the firm’s pre-
IPO banking relationships to the underwriters managing the firm’s new equity issuance and tests whether
relationships established before the firm’s IPO ameliorate asymmetric information problems behind IPO un-
derpricing. The results show that, on average, firms with a pre-IPO banking relationship with a prospective
underwriter experience about 17% less underpricing than firms without such banking relationships. How-
ever, this paper has several limitations. First, the sample period is very short, from January 1, 1998 to De-
cember 31, 2000. Between 1998-1999, commercial banks could underwrite equity issuance only indirectly
through the bank’s section 20 subsidiary. Also, this sample period includes the dot-com bubble (1998-2000),
during which IPO underpricing was unusually severe. The paper addresses this with a robustness test which
removes the dot-com bubble and shows that the results still hold; however, this leaves only one year in the
sample period. Second, the sample includes only 306 firms, raising concerns over the external validity of the
regression model. Third, this paper defines any situation in which a firm’s IPO underwriter has lent to the
firm in the past as relationship banking. This definition is not as strong as those used in the prior literature.
For example, Gopalan et al. (2011) limit relationship banking to cases in which the lead arranger has lent
to the firm in the past. A fourth concern is the empirical setting and model specification of the paper. The
simple OLS regression model is just a preliminary test. Treated firms are those for which a pre-IPO lender
could have or managed the firm’s IPO, while control firms have not received loans from their IPO underwrit-
ers. However, in this setting, different levels of underpricing between treated firms and control firms may
be caused by unobserved differences between them, and not necessarily due to relationship banking. More
importantly, results are affected by the selection issue here I discussed in the introduction. My empirical
9James and Wier (1990) signal is that good firms take out loans and bad firms do not. However, as I explain more in detail
below, it is possible for a bad firm to apply for and receive a loan and thus inadvertently be pooled with the good firms. In this case,
it would be difficult for investors to distinguish between the two types of firms. In contrast, in my model, the signal is that bad firms
borrow while good firms go directly to the capital market.
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design partially addresses these concerns by employing difference-in-differences regression design, using
variation in the strength of the lending relationships between IPO firms and their underwriters generated by
the random event of the repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act. I also employ reduced form instrumental variable
regression. Instead of defining treated firms as firms with IPO underwriters that are also relationship banks,
I use as an instrument for treatment IPO firms that had relationship banks at least three years before their
IPO.
3 Theoretical Analysis
3.1 The Model
3.1.1 Assumptions
There are two types of firms with the same expected value in the model. The good firms, denoted by
G, are characterized by low dispersion of market value, while bad firms, denoted by B, are characterized
by high dispersion of market value. Each firm has a project that needs financing of D dollars such that
OPB < D < OPG.10 The project payoff represents the firm’s true market value. Both types of firms can
obtain financing from either the debt market or the capital market. In the capital market, some underpricing
is necessary to compensate uninformed investors for their anticipated losses on overpriced issuances and
to compensate informed investors (institutional investors) for revealing information about the firm. The
underpricing is necessary to ensure these investors’ continued participation in the capital market.11
3.1.2 Major Players
My model includes three types of players: relationship banks (they are also IPO underwriters), firms (bor-
rowers), and investors.
Banks that choose lending relationships (the key focus of this paper) use relationship loans12 or use
transaction loans. Costly sector specialization is necessary for relationship loans. Banks that choose under-
writing relationships (not the key focus in this paper) act as a broker to help the firm by underwriting its
debt or equity issuance in the capital market. Their role differs from making transaction loans since the un-
derwriter does not have federal deposit insurance and thus incurs search costs to find the highest valuations
10OPJ is the offer proceeds to firm type J.
11Please refer to the Appendix for more details on the model assumptions.
12Permitting the bank to use its expertise to improve the firm’s project payoff, which ultimately improves the market value of
the firm.
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from investors, introducing randomness into the firm’s cost of funding, which depends on realized demand
for the firm’s securities.
The distributions of possible market values (V˜ ) for each type of firm are uniform: V˜G∼U [aG,bG], V˜B
∼U [aB,bB], where aG > aB, bG < bB. Each firm has a project that needs financing of D dollars, which can
be either raised from a bank through a lending or underwriting relationship or by the equity market through
an IPO. Each firm has project payoff representing its realized market value.
Investors are risk-neutral agents who demand an expected return at least equal to the riskless rate. They
purchase corporate debt, participate in IPOs, and invest in bank deposits for investment purposes. Investors
know the probability distributions of V˜G and V˜B and the proportion of good and bad firms in the market but
cannot classify ex ante individual firms by type.
3.1.3 Sequence of Events
At T = 0, each bank assesses a probability G(θ) over a firm quality θ . Banks decide whether they want
to pursue a lending relationship or an underwriting relationship with the firms. If they choose a lending
relationship, they need to choose whether they want to offer relationship lending or transaction lending. For
relationship lending, they choose their degree of specialization γ .
At T = 1, firms can attempt to borrow D dollars repaid at T = 3. They pursue an IPO if the loan
request is denied. Firms may also decide not to apply for a loan and instead go directly to the equity market.
Each firm is stochastically matched with a bank. Each bank observes the quality (I will define this when I
describe the firms) of the firms. The bank then makes a decision about whether to allocate service capacity
to transaction lending or relationship lending. Firms now observe the sector specialization of the banks
they were initially paired with. Banks choosing underwriting relationships search for investors to purchase
underwritten debt issuances.
At T = 2, shares issued at T = 1 are traded in the secondary market. Loans are made by banks. Debt
issuances are sold by underwriters in the capital market.
At T = 3, for firms that borrowed private debt, project payoffs are realized and banks are repaid if
possible. For firms that borrowed public debt, debt issuances are repaid if possible.
3.1.4 More Model Details
The types of securities are: Unsecured loans (banks) or corporate debt (market), IPOs with primary and
secondary shares.
A firm’s payoff with transaction loans is Y with probability θ ∈ (0,1) and 0 with probability 1− θ .
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Higher quality firm has higher θ . A borrow’s payoff with relationship lending is Y with probability θ +
νi [1−θ ] and 0 with probability [1−θ ] [1−νi], where νi ∈ (0,1)is a variable that depends on the bank’s
type i, which represents the sector specialization of the bank. Firms can attempt to borrow D dollars repaid
at T = 3. If they are approved, they receive a loan; if they are denied, they pursue an IPO for funding. Firms
may also decide not to apply for a loan, instead going directly to the equity market to raise D dollar via an
IPO.
Under lending relationships, banks obtain completely insured deposits at an expected all-in cost rd > r f
, from Boot and Thakor (2000) we know that banks make two decisions. The first decision is the sector-
specialization (γ j) decision for relationship lending at cost = C¯i (γ) = µb (θ)Ci (γ), where γ ∈ (0,1) is the
degree of sector specialization and µb (θ)is a function that depends on the measure of the set of firm θ ’s
served by banks with relationship loans. Ci (γ)> 0, with C
′
i > 0, and C
′′
i > x (for x sufficiently large). A bank
choose γ = γ j enhances the firm’s success probability by νi = γ jνH +(1− γ j)νL, with νH > νL. Thus if a
bank chooses not to specializing at all (γ j = 0), then νi = νL. The second decision is the allocation of bank’s
lending capacity between relationship lending and transaction lending at T = 2. With relationship lending,
in addition to C¯i (γ), there is a variable cost S per loan, where S < νL [1−θ ]Y ; this restriction ensures that
relationship loans are feasible for all γ , even if γ = 0 the incremental value added by a relationship loan
exceeds the cost for at least the lowest-quality firm. In the underwriting relationship, we know from Boot
and Thakor (2000) that the banks must search for investors. D˜ is the random demand for securities with a
uniform density function. Banks’ funding cost is r fθ−1if D˜≥ $D; r fθ−1+τ if D˜< $D, where τ is a penalty
cost measuring underwriting efficiency.
I assume that interbank competition level is low throughout the paper.
3.2 Analysis of Offer Pricing
3.2.1 Model Case One (no borrowing exists)
First, I assume that no borrowing exists. In this case, firms are indistinguishable to uninformed investors;
all firms are pooled. Thus, IPO proceeds are the same regardless of firm type. If firm types were known,
Beatty and Ritter (1986) and Carter and Manaster (1990) show that equilibrium in the primary market would
require:
NC = λ
{
piB
∫ bB
OPB
[
V˜B−OPB
]
f
(
V˜B
)
dV˜B
}
+(1−λ )
{
piG
∫ bG
OPG
[
V˜G−OPG
]
f
(
V˜G
)
dV˜G
}
(1)
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and
0 = λ
{∫ OPB
aB
[
OPB−V˜B
]
f
(
V˜B
)
dV˜B+(1−piB)
∫ bB
OPB
[
V˜B−OPB
]
f (V˜B)dV˜B
}
+(1−λ )
{∫ OPG
aG
[
OPG−V˜G
]
f
(
V˜G
)
dV˜G+(1−piG)
∫ bG
OPG
[
V˜G−OPG
]
f (V˜G)dV˜G
}
(2)
Where OPJ is the offer proceeds to firm J, N is the number of informed investors, C is the cost per
investor of becoming informed, and piJ is the proportion of shares of firm J that are acquired by informed
investors.
Equation (1) shows that in equilibrium, the profits from underpricing reaped by informed investors
should be equal to the aggregate cost of becoming informed. Thus, informed investors earn zero expected
profits. Meanwhile, equation (2) states that, in equilibrium, uninformed investors’ expected losses from
overpricing are equal to their underpricing gains.13 OPP denotes the offer proceeds when firm types are not
observable ex ante to outsiders and firms are all pooled together. The expected market values of both types
of firms are the same, but because offer proceeds are decreasing in ex ante uncertainty,
OPB < OPP < OPG
Where OPB = offer proceeds for bad firms, assuming firm types are known ex ante, and OPG = offer
proceeds for good firms, assuming firm types are known ex ante. That is, good firms would receive higher
proceeds and bad firms would receive lower proceeds if their types were known, because uninformed in-
vestors face greater adverse selection risk in purchasing shares of bad firms and therefore require greater
underpricing to participate in IPOs (Beatty and Ritter, 1986). Thus, in this case, the good firm suffers and
the bad firm benefits, since the former would receive higher proceeds and the latter would receive lower
proceeds if their types were known.
3.2.2 Model Case Two (borrowing exists & update on James and Wier (1990) model)
In this second case, both transaction lending and relationship lending are available. All transaction lending
decisions are public. All relationship lending decisions are confidential. The underwriting bank can be
informed about the firm’s value.
13Uninformed investors’ expected losses from overpricing = λ
∫ OPB
aB
[
OPB−V˜B
]
f
(
V˜B
)
dV˜B+(1−λ )
∫ OPG
aG
[
OPG−V˜G
]
f
(
V˜G
)
dV˜G;
their underpricing gains = λ (1−piB)
∫ bB
OPB
[
V˜B−OPB
]
f (V˜B)dV˜B +λ (1−piG)
∫ bG
OPG
[
V˜G−OPG
]
f (V˜G)dV˜G.
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Since we assume that OPB < D < OPG, the good firm will always borrow. Bad firms’ loan applications
may be denied, since the lending decision depends on the bank’s estimate of the firm’s market value. If the
bank’s estimate of the firm’s value falls below D, then the application will be denied. Thus, bad firms will
compare expected IPO proceeds if they do apply for a loan to the expected IPO proceeds if they do not. The
expected offer proceeds (OPBP) for a bad firm if it applies for a loan is:
FB (D)OPBR+[1−FB (D)]OPBG = OPBP (3)
Where
FB (D) = probability that the true market value of a bad firm is less than D, which also represents the
probability of denial when the bad firm applies to borrow D dollars,
OPBR = offer proceeds for bad firms conditional on being rejected a loan of size D dollars,
OPBG = offer proceeds for bad firms conditional on being granted a loan of size D dollars.
Since banks’ lending decisions are public, any firm whose loan application is denied will be revealed
as a bad firm. This is the downside risk for a bad firm applying for a loan of D dollars. On the other hand,
if the bad firm receives the loan, then its expected market value will be higher than that of the good firm,
since the bad firm’s value is distributed over U [D,bB], while the good firm’s market value is distributed over
U [aG,bG], and D > aG, bB > bG. Thus OPBG will be higher than OPG. This is the upside for a bad firm
applying for a loan. The reason that the bad firm can receive OPBG when it receives the loan is because
in my paper, the commercial bank acts as an underwriter knows the firm value when it grants a loan to a
bad firm. Thus this bad firm will receive higher offer proceeds (compared to a good firm) due to the higher
expected market value. In James and Wier (1990), the bad firm receives the same offer proceeds OPG with
the good firm since the underwriter is uninformed of the firm value. The underwriter in their model views
all firms with loans as good firms and provides the same offer proceeds to all the good firms.
If OPBP is lower than OPB, then the bad firm bears the entire cost of applying for loans and doesn’t
reap the full benefits. In this case, the bad firm will have no incentive to borrow while the good firm will
always borrow. As a result, the two kinds of firms can be distinguished, decreasing information asymmetry
and IPO underpricing. The good firm is better off in this case because OPG > OPP. In contrast, the bad firm
will be worse off than in the no-borrowing pooling case, because OPBP < OPB < OPP, which means that no
matter whether the bad firm borrows (getting OPBP) or not (getting OPB), its payoff will be lower than in the
pooling case (getting OPP).
However, if OPBP is higher than OPB, the bad firm will borrow. By borrowing, it collects an expected
12
payoff of OPBP, which is higher than the expected payoff from not borrowing (OPB). In this case, the two
kinds of firms cannot be distinguished by the borrowing behavior alone.
Thus, in this second model scenario, it’s uncertain whether we can distinguish between the two kinds of
firms just by observing whether a firm borrows. Even if we do manage to distinguish good from bad firms,
the bad firm will be worse off, receiving lower proceeds than it would have in the pooling case.
In sum, both cases above result in one type of firm being worse off. Thus, we ask whether a case exists
in which both types of firms can be better off. In the following case, I develop a new model in order to
determine whether relationship lending can help reduce underpricing while improving outcomes for both
types of firms.
3.2.3 Model Case Three (borrowing exists & new model)
In this case, both transaction lending and relationship lending are available. All transaction lending decisions
are public. All relationship lending decisions are confidential. The underwriting bank can be informed about
the firm’s value.
There is very low competition among banks in my model. Then according to Boot and Thakor (2000)
we can assume that banks can extract full rents. Good firms receive transaction loans, and bad firms receive
relationship loans. The intuition behind this, according to Boot and Thakor (2000), is that, when competition
is limited, banks can capture most of the incremental benefit of a relationship loan: by relying on their sector
specialization, banks can improve the bad firm’s project payoff much more than that of the good firm. Boot
and Thakor (2000) show that the incremental benefit of a relationship loan is decreasing in firm quality, and
it costs the bank more to provide a relationship loan than to provide a transaction loan; that is, a cost S is
incurred for relationship loans.14 Because this cost is independent of firm quality but the benefit is decreasing
in firm quality, at a sufficiently high quality the cost of a relationship loan exceeds its marginal benefit. This
leads to a cutoff level in Boot and Thakor (2000) such that the bank prefers to provide relationship loans
to the firms below the cutoff and transaction loans to the firms above the cutoff. Thus, in this paper, we
can assume that the bank makes relationship loans to bad firms (high dispersion) and transaction loans to
good firms (low dispersion). If the investors can easily observe and identify which firms receive transaction
loans and which firms receive relationship loans, then a separating equilibrium, which decreases information
asymmetry, is possible.
It is sometimes difficult for investors to identify exactly which firms receive relationship loans and
which receive transaction loans. Even if this occurs, relationship lending makes a separating equilibrium
14Transaction loans do not have this variable cost S.
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possible.
Bad firms receive relationship loans, so the true market value of the bad firm can be calculated as
follows:
VB = [θ +νi (1−θ)]Y −φ −RR−S
Where Y = (aB+bB)/2, θ is the measure of the firm’s quality (with higher θ representing higher-
quality firms with lower dispersion of market value), φ is the bank’s expected all-in funding cost (which is
also the borrowing cost from the firm’s perspective), RR is the relationship loan rent, and S is the bank’s
cost of servicing a relationship loan. Let VB > OPB, which implies that bad firms find it profitable to borrow
since the bank, as the underwriter, knows the firm’s true market value, and investors recognize this; thus,
borrowing raises the offer proceeds.
In comparison, good firms, receive transaction loans, thus the true market value of the good firm can be
calculated as follows:
V = θY −φ −T R
Where Y = (aG+bG)/2, and TR is the transaction loan rent. Let VG < OPP, which implies that good
firms find it unprofitable to borrow, since their project payoff – with the transaction loan representing its true
market value – is smaller than the pooling equilibrium offer proceeds.
Thus, the separating equilibrium in this case is that bad firms borrow, while good firms do not borrow,
instead going directly to the equity market. Hence, information asymmetry is reduced and, consequently,
IPO underpricing is also reduced.
The intuition behind this concept is similar to an idea proposed in Boot and Thakor (2000). Banks’
expected funding cost for transaction loans is independent of firm quality, whereas the firm’s expected cost
of capital market funding is decreasing in firm quality. So, the bank’s rents on a transaction loan decline as
firm quality improves, because the competition that bank faces from the capital market is greater for higher-
quality firms. Thus Boot and Thakor (2000) propose another cutoff, representing a firm quality so high that
the bank’s rent on transaction loans to that borrower is zero. For borrowers above this cutoff, the bank’s
rent becomes negative. Thus, the highest-quality firms reply on the capital market. For this reason, I can
plausibly assume that good firms go directly to the capital market. Note that I assume very low interbank
competition; if competition intensifies, these results may change.
Thus, the conditions for a separating equilibrium are:
[θ +νi (1−θ)]Y −φ −RR−S > OPB (4)
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and
θY −φ −T R < OPP (5)
Taken together, expressions (4) and (5) imply that for a common cost of establishing credit (φ = φG = φB),
Separation requires:
θY −T R−λOPB− (1−λ )OPG < φ < [θ +υi (1−θ)]Y −RR−S−OPB (6)
Thus the cost of borrowing required to separate firms by type will depend on the degree of dispersion
of the firm’s market value (θ), the expected market value of the firm (Y ), transaction lending rent (T R),
offer proceeds for the bad firm (OPB), offer proceeds forthe good firm (OPG), the proportion of bad firms in
the population (λ ), bank’s degree of sector specialization (νi), the relationship lending rent (RR), and the
variable cost of relationship lending (S).
4 Empirical Analysis
4.1 Testable Hypotheses
The prior section suggests three testable predictions regarding the relation between relationship banking and
IPO underpricing:
Prediction 1: Relationship banking can reduce IPO underpricing for all firms that go public, regardless
of the strength of their relationships with their underwriters.
Prediction 2: Firms that have a relationship bank experience larger reduction in IPO underpricing
compared to other firms.
Prediction 3: Relationship banking reduces information asymmetry between the underwriter and the
firm as well as between the firm and investors.
To define relationship banking, I observe a firm’s pre-IPO lenders. If, three years before an IPO, the
firm at least has a lead bank of a syndicated loan that has also lent to the firm in the past (Gopalan et al.,
2011), that bank is defined as the firm’s relationship bank. This makes sense because banks learn about
their client firms through continuous monitoring, which is not likely to continue once a loan is repaid. Also,
given that an important aspect of bank-firm relationship is a bank’s faith in the management of the firm, a
termination of relationship is not a positive signal. Hence, I do not consider past lending that has long been
terminated as relationship banking.
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To identify the lead bank for the loan I follow standard practice in bank relationship literature.15 The
lead arranger for any facility of the deal is considered a lead arranger for the syndicated loan. For a sole
lender facility, I consider the lender to be the lead bank. To identify the lead arranger for a multiple-lender
facility, I follow Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010). In particular, the administrative agent of a syndicated loan
is defined as the lead bank in cases where the database identifies an administrative agent. If the syndicate
does not have an administrative agent, then any lenders that act as agent, arranger, bookrunner, lead arranger,
lead bank, or lead manager are defined as lead banks.
To measure the degree of the firm’s information uncertainty, I use the average standard deviation of daily
returns over the sample period for all firms in the same industry as the firm pursuing an IPO as the proxy for
information asymmetry. It is reasonable to assume that, during the sample period, firms in higher-volatility
industries are in general more opaque than firms in lower-volatility industries.16
4.2 Data and Empirical Methodology
4.2.1 Data
Various data sources are used for this study. First, I construct the sample by identifying all IPOs in the
US between January 1, 1990 and December 31, 2006 that appear in the Securities Data Corporation (SDC)
database, list common stock on the NYSE, NASDAQ, or AMEX, file registration statements on form S-
1 with the SEC, and make available the stock price and accounting information necessary for my tests.17
Because the dot-com bubble (1998-2000) featured severe IPO underpricing and allegations of underwriter
misconduct such as “spinning” and “laddering”, I exclude this period in my analyses. Thus, the period prior
to the repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act (“pre-repeal”) is 1990-1997 and the period after the repeal (“post-
repeal”) is 2001-2006. From SDC I obtain the issuer, SIC, ticker, industry, IPO date, IPO offer price, the
lead underwriter, the listed exchange, industry, proceeds, first day closing price, primary shares, total issued
shares, whether the firm was venture-backed or not and net proceeds. I obtain the revenue, net income, total
assets, total debt, long-term debt, cash and short-term investment, EBIT, EBITDA, gross profit, operating
cash flow, working capital, and book value of equity of all IPO firms from Compustat and make sure each
firm has at least 5 years of pre-IPO data. Then I exclude IPOs that are leveraged buyouts, closed-end funds,
open-end funds, trusts, and special purpose vehicles (i.e., SIC codes 6091, 6371, 6722,6726,6732,6733, and
6799).
15Please see Hertzel and Officer (2012) for details and justification.
16The reason for using this measure as the proxy for information asymmetry is explained in detail in the empirical methodology
section under Prediction 3.
17In which the contract between the underwriting bank and the issuing firm is a firm commitment contract.
16
To identify those firms that had relationship banks before their IPO,18 I use the Dealscan database of
bank loans. Finally, I link the data from Compustat and SDC with the data from Dealscan database.19
4.2.2 Empirical Methodology
4.2.2.1 Prediction 1
The regression model is as follows:
Yi = β0+β1 ∗Post+ τXi+δk + εi (7)
The subscript i refers to IPO firms in the sample. I employ a cross-sectional dataset of IPO firms with
a reduced form instrumental variable regression design. Corresponding to the theoretical prediction that
relationship banking can reduce IPO underpricing for all firms that go public, regardless of the strength of
their relationship with their underwriter, I employ three sets of regressions in this step. All three regressions
have the same regression model as (7) and consist of all firms, treated firms only, and control firms only,
respectively. For the group difference, I observe each firm’s pre-IPO lenders three years before the IPO. If
the firm has a lead bank of a loan that has also lent to it in the past (Gopalan et al., 2011), that bank is defined
as the firm’s relationship bank. Thus, a firm with a relationship bank at least three years before an IPO is
defined as a treated firm. The other firms are defined as control firms.
Considering all firms that use their relationship banks as underwriters to be treated firms could lead to
selection bias if these firms are in some way different from firms that do not choose to be underwritten by
a relationship bank. Firms that choose a relationship bank as their underwriter presumably do so because it
is beneficial to them; similarly, firms that do not choose a relationship bank as their IPO underwriter likely
do not find it beneficial for them to do so. If this is true, my estimate of the effect of relationship banking
on IPO prices is likely too high. I might even observe a statistically positive relationship when a null or
negative relationship exists. This is why I employ a reduced form instrumental variable approach.
If most of the treated firms’ IPO underwriters are also their relationship banks, then the instrument I
use is valid. Indeed, I find that, in the post-repeal period, 96 of the 144 treated firms (nearly 70%) have
their relationship bank as their underwriter. The control firms in the empirical analysis correspond to the
good firms (low dispersion of market value) in the theoretical model; similarly, the treated firms correspond
to bad firms (high dispersion of market value). In the theoretical model, the good firms go directly to the
18These are treated firms.
19To link the data from Compustat and SDC with the data from Dealscan database, I use the Dealscan_link_Compustat dataset,
which is available on Michael Roberts’s website. This dataset connects the Dealscan database with Compustat.
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capital market (and do not have relationship banks), while the bad firms receive relationship loans. Due to
the relationship banks’ sector specialization, the bad firms’ projects payoffs improve, as does their quality;
thus, they can later go to the capital market at a lower cost. Table 8 shows that treated firms’ degree of
information uncertainty is 5.88 higher than control firms’ degree of information uncertainty, as measured by
the average standard deviation of daily returns over the sample period for all firms in the same industry as
the firm pursuing an IPO. This result confirms that the treated firms have a higher dispersion of market value
than control firms.
Post is a dummy variable that equals to one if the IPO date is after the repeal of the Glass–Steagall Act
on November 12, 1999 and zero otherwise.20 Xi is a vector of control variables. I include industry fixed
effects. Since the Post dummy is included in the regression, I exclude year fixed effects. I include three sets
of control variables: firm characteristics, IPO characteristics and macroeconomic environment.
For firm characteristics, I use the following variables: TobinQ is the firm’s Tobin’s Q and accounts for
the firm’s intangible assets and growth prospects. Following Chung and Pruitt (1994), I approximate Tobin’s
Q as the ratio of the market value of the firm’s common stock plus the book value of preferred stock and debt
to the firm’s total assets. The book value of debt and assets are collected from Compustat in the pre-IPO
year. The market value of equity is the product of the IPO offer price and the number of shares offered in
the IPO. lnRealAge is the natural logarithm of the number of years from the firm’s founding date, or from
incorporation if the founding date is unavailable, to the date of the IPO.21 PreIPOlnassets variable is the
natural logarithm of the firm’s total assets in the pre-IPO year. The PreIPOdebt_assets variable is calculated
as total debt divided by total assets in the pre-IPO year. This variable is used to control for the firm’s financial
leverage. The PreIPOcash_assets variable is calculated as total cash and short-term investments divided by
total assets in the pre-IPO year. This variable is used to control for the firm’s liquidity.
For IPO characteristics, I include the following variables: lnIPO_sharesoffered is the natural logarithm
of the number of total shares offered in a firm’s IPO. VC is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm
is venture-backed pre-IPO, and zero otherwise. I also control for the stock exchange hosting the IPO,
using IPO_major_exchange, a dummy variable equal to one if the firm is listed either on NYSE or Nasdaq
(Ragozzino and Reuer, 2006). Listing on the major exchanges can enhance the firm’s visibility; exchanges
also differ markedly in the listing requirements imposed on firms (Draho, 2004). For example, the NYSE
requires that all its listed companies’ trade at no less than $1 per share, and that their market capitalizations
be no less than $50 million. NASDAQ poses identical requirements for the stock price, but it only demands
20The time period between January 1, 1990 and December 31, 1997 is the pre-repeal period and the time period between January
1, 2001 and December 31, 2006 is the post-repeal period.
21The firms’ founding dates are collected from Jay Ritter’s web-page.
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a minimum capitalization of $1.1 million. Major stock exchanges such as the NYSE or NASDAQ also
impose administrative fees and regulatory restrictions on their companies, such as heightened expectations
regarding corporate responsibility, conflicts of interest, auditing, etc.; in contrast over-the-counter markets
(OTC) often have no requirements at all. IPOproceeds_assets is the total proceeds from the IPO divided by
firm assets in the pre-IPO year.
To control for the macroeconomic environment as well as industry differences, I include two variables:
Internet_IPO and lnnumber_of_IPOs. Internet_IPO is a dummy variable assuming a value of one if the firm
is an internet related firm, and zero otherwise.22 Finally, the variable lnnumber_of_IPOs is included in the
specification to account for broader, macroeconomic factors over time that might influence the features of
IPOs. This variable is computed as the total number of initial public offerings in the firm’s IPO year, using
data obtained from Ibbotson et al. (1994).
To test Prediction 1, I employ IPO_underpricing as the outcome variable to analyze the effect of rela-
tionship banking on firms’ IPO underpricing.
4.2.2.2 Prediction 2
The regression model is as follows:
Yi = β0+β1 ∗Treated ∗Post+β2 ∗Treated+ τXi+δk +δt + εi (8)
In this regression model, the subscript i refers to IPO firms in the sample. I employ a cross-sectional
dataset of IPO firms to test my second prediction, which anticipates that firms that have a relationship
bank experience larger reductions in IPO underpricing than other firms. Ideally, I want to compare IPO
underpricing for a firm with relationship banking to the same firm’s hypothetical IPO underpricing had
they not chosen the relationship bank as the IPO underwriter. Since the latter is not observable, I employ
difference-in-differences regression design. The identifying event is the repeal of the Glass–Steagall Act
on November 12, 1999, and the sample period is from 1990 to 2006. The IPO firms in the pre-repeal and
post-repeal periods are different firms. Post is defined in the same way as before. I also employ reduced
form instrumental variable regression as in Prediction 1 with the same instrument and the same definition
for treated and control firm. Xi represents the same vector of control variables as in Prediction 1, and
IPO_underpricing remains the outcome variable.
4.2.2.3 Prediction 3
22I use the list of internet IPO firms provided on Jay Ritter’s web-page.
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The regression model in this step is as follows:
Yi = β0+β1 ∗ In f ormationAsymmetry∗Treated ∗Post+β2 ∗ In f ormationAsymmetry∗Treated
+β3 ∗ In f ormationAsymmetry∗Post+β4 ∗ In f ormationAsymmetry
+β5 ∗Treated ∗Post+β6 ∗Treated+ τXi+δk +δt + εi (9)
The subscript i refers to IPO firms in the sample. All other specifications are the same as in regression
model (8).
I argue that the degree of IPO underpricing is related to the amount of uncertainty the underwriter
and investors have about the true value of the firm. Relationship banking reduces this uncertainty and,
consequently, minimizes IPO underpricing. I employ a triple difference-in-differences approach. As the
proxy for information asymmetry, I use the average standard deviation of daily returns over the sample
period for all firms in the same industry as the firm pursuing an IPO. This proxy for information asymmetry
is calculated once and is not allowed to vary over time. This variable allows me to make sure that it is
the cross-sectional variation in information asymmetry that influences the interaction term, rather than any
industrywide changes in information asymmetry over time. Hence this measure is better than the time-
varying measure, which calculates the average standard deviation of daily returns on an industry level for
each year in the sample. This measure is also better than most firm-specific measures since it does not
involve any post-IPO data.
For Prediction 3, I also employ IPO_underpricing as the outcome variable.
4.3 Summary Statistics
This section presents summary statistics for independent and dependent variables employed in the regression
model. Summary statistics are reported in Tables 1-2. The total number of firms is 2,376. In the pre-repeal
period, there are 1,787 firms, including 235 treated firms and 1,552 control firms. In the post-repeal period,
there are 589 firms in total, including 144 treated firms and 445 control firms. Panel A of Table 1 shows the
summary statistics for the independent variables. Panel B of Table 1 reports the results of univariate tests
for the null hypothesis that differences in independent variables between treated and control firms are equal
to zero. The biggest differences between treated firms and control firms are in the ratio of IPO proceeds
to assets, Tobin’s Q, and total assets. Control firms have higher IPO proceeds relative to their assets and
higher Tobin’s Q measures than treated firms. The treated firms are larger than the control firms. It is
interesting to note that these differences all decrease in the post-repeal period. I control for these differences
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by (i) including these characteristics as additional independent variables, and (ii) using a propensity-score
matched sample.
Panel A of Table 2 shows summary statistics for the outcome variable. Panel B of Table 2 reports
the results of univariate tests for the null hypothesis that the difference in the of outcome variable between
treated and control firms is equal to zero. As we can see from Panel B of Table 2, treated firms’ IPO
underpricing is lower on average than the control firms’ IPO underpricing. Specifically, treated firms’ IPO
underpricing in the pre-repeal period is 5.7% lower than that of control firms; this difference nearly doubles
to 11.28% in the post-repeal period.
4.4 Empirical Results
In this section, I discuss the empirical results of this study related to my three central predictions.
4.4.1 Prediction 1
Table 3 reports the results of the regression model shown in Equation (7). The coefficients for Post are
negative and statistically significant for all three columns. After the repeal of the Glass–Steagall Act, which
allowed firms’ relationship banks to underwrite their IPOs, IPO underpricing decreases for all firms by
about 5.3 percentage points on average. This decrease is larger for treated firms than control firms (10.2
percentage points vs. 2.6 percentage points, respectively). These results confirm Prediction 1: relationship
banking reduces all firms’ IPO underpricing. The results suggest that the decrease in IPO underpricing is
larger for treated firms than control firms; I further examine this phenomenon in the next subsection.
4.4.2 Prediction 2
Table 4 column (1) reports the results of the regression model shown in Equation (8). The coefficient
for Treated is negative and statistically significant. The coefficient for Treated*Post is also negative and
significant. These results confirm that (i) average IPO underpricing is lower for treated firms, and (ii) that
IPO underpricing for the treated firms fell by 6.5 percentage points more relative to the change in the control
firms between the two periods (after controlling for other determinants of underpricing). These results
confirm Prediction 2: relationship banking reduces IPO underpricing more substantially for firms that have
a relationship bank before their IPO than other firms.
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4.4.3 Prediction 3
Table 5 column (1) reports the results of the regression model shown in Equation (9). The coefficients
for Average_SD_sic and Average_SD_sic_Post are both positive and statistically significant23 confirming
that firms facing higher information asymmetry have higher IPO underpricing. The coefficient for Aver-
age_SD_sic_Treated is negative, which means that among firms with relationship banks pre-IPO, relation-
ship banking reduces IPO underpricing more for those with higher information asymmetry. The coefficient
for Average_SD_sic_Treated_Post is negative and statistically significant, showing that, between the two pe-
riods, underpricing for treated firms with higher information uncertainty fell by 3.3 more percentage points
relative to the change in more transparent treated firms. This supports Prediction 3: relationship banking
reduces IPO underpricing by decreasing the firm’s information asymmetry.
4.5 Robustness
4.5.1 Parallel Trend Assumption
The difference-in-differences approach relies on the parallel trend assumption. From Figure 1, we can see
that before the repeal of the Glass–Steagall Act, both treated firms and control firms have similar patterns in
underpricing though control firms have higher underpricing on average. For both sets of firms, IPO under-
pricing spiked sharply during the dot-com bubble (1998-2000).24 Thus, including 1998-2000 in the sample
period could potentially bias the results.25 By focusing on the period 2001-2006, we can see difference
between treated firms’ and control firms’ underpricing becomes larger on average after Glass–Steagall is
repealed. Most importantly, Figure 1 also confirms that the decrease in control firms’ underpricing in the
post-repeal period is not simply a continuation of pre-repeal period trend: treated firms’ underpricing is not
decreasing in the pre-repeal period.
4.5.2 Unobservable IPO Characteristics
As we can see from Panel B of Table 1, all of the control variables are significantly different between
the treated firms and control firms in the pre-repeal period. These differences lead to the concern that
unobservable variables may be driving the changes in treated firms’ IPO underpricing after the repeal of
the Glass–Steagall Act. In order to address this concern, I analyze the trends in all control variables that
23Average_SD_sic is the proxy for information asymmetry, I use the average standard deviation of daily returns over the sample
period for all firms in the same industry as the firm pursuing an IPO.
24For reasons why IPO underpricing rose during the dot-com bubble, please refer to Loughran and Ritter (2002).
25While the fact that the increase is larger for the control group actually supports Prediction 2, but for wrong reasons, so it might
artificially inflate the significance of relationship banking.
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differ significantly between treated and control firms in the pre-repeal period. These control variables are:
IPO proceeds/assets, IPO shares offered, Tobin’s Q and pre-IPO assets. If these trends change from the
pre-repeal period to the post-repeal period, it is possible that unobservable factors are causing the change.
Figure 2 and 3 plot the evolution of the two control variables representing IPO characteristics: IPO
proceeds/assets and IPO shares offered. Figure 2 shows that IPO proceeds/assets follows a similar pattern
for both treated and control firms over the pre-repeal and post-repeal periods. This control variable spikes
during the dot-com bubble of 1998-2000. Since IPO underpricing during this period is severe while IPO
shares offered don’t change substantially from other periods, total IPO proceeds are much lower during
1998-2000. This means that the increase in IPO proceeds/assets is caused by a decrease in firms’ total
assets.26 The trends in IPO shares offered are also similar across both treated and control firms over the
pre-repeal and post-repeal periods.
4.5.3 Unobservable Firm Characteristics
Figure 4 and 5 plot the evolution of the two control variables representing firm characteristics: Tobin’s Q
and preIPOlnassets. Figure 4 shows that Tobin’s Q follows a similar pattern for both treated and control
firms over the pre-repeal and post-repeal periods. This control variable spikes during the dot-com bubble of
1998-2000. Tobin’s Q is calculated as the ratio of the firm’s market value of common stock plus the book
value of preferred stock and debt, divided by its total assets. The market value of common stock is calculated
by multiplying the firm’s IPO offer price by the number of shares issued. Since IPO underpricing is severe
during 1998-2000, average IPO offer prices are very low. Hence, we can interpret this spike in the same way
as the spike in IPO proceeds/assets during 1998-2000 is caused by the increasing number of internet and
high-tech firms pursuing IPOs, which translates to lower total firm assets on average. Figure 5 shows that
treated firms are on average larger than control firms in terms of pre-IPO assets. There is a potential concern
that larger firms may be more likely to have a relationship bank and consequently, lower IPO underpricing;
this concern is mitigated by the fact that, in the post-repeal period, control firms’ size increases on average,
moving closer to treated firms’ average size.
4.5.4 Unobservable Underwriter Characteristics
Panel B of Tables 3, 4 and 5 includes control variables for underwriter characteristics. If there are some
underwriters more likely to underprice more on average, or underwriters more likely to fall prey to a corrup-
26In 1999, 57.4% of IPOs involved internet firms, compared to 2.9%-14.8% in prior years and 36.9% in 2000. High-tech
companies accounted for around one third of the sample in 1998 and nearly half the sample in 1999-2000 (Ljungqvist and Wilhelm,
2003).
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tion hypothesis, then including underwriter fixed effects should control for this effect. However, underwriter
fixed effects are not feasible in this setting due to the lack of variation among the underwriters. In other
words, underwriter fixed effects in this setting would capture the average difference in the underpricing
between treated and control firms. Alternatively, I include a measure of the underwriter’s reputation to con-
trol for potential unobservable underwriter characteristics.27 I also control for IPO underwriter’s pre-IPO
loan amount in the IPO firm. Banks face a potential conflict of interest that arises from the possibility that a
bank’s existing claims might be retired from the firm’s security proceeds. The results of this paper are robust
to these controls.
4.5.5 Propensity Score Matching
In order to mitigate the concern that control firms are significantly different from treated firms in the pre-
repeal period, I employ the propensity score matching method to obtain control firms that are more similar
to the treated firms. To estimate the propensity scores, I select three control variables exhibit the greatest
differences in means between treated and control firms in the pre-repeal period before matching and match
firms on the basis of these variables. Table 6 presents the univariate analysis for the control variables in
the propensity score matched sample. The matched sample consists of 761 firms in total. The average
differences in all three control variables between treated and control firms are lower compared to the initial
sample, and are no longer significant. These findings suggest that the propensity score matching approach
achieve covariate balance and hence a successful match.
Column (3) of Tables 4 and 5 shows that my results hold for the propensity score matched sample, as
the key coefficient is still significantly negative.
4.5.6 Economic Factors
Finally, I examine the levels of economic conditions during the sample period in Figures 6-7. Although I use
time fixed effects in my analysis, it is necessary to examine the two periods on a macro level, since time fixed
effects control only for the average effects of macro-economic factors on all firms. Suppose, for instance,
that the GDP growth rate affects IPO underpricing more strongly for treated firms than control firms; in this
case, GDP growth rate might be the driving force behind differences in IPO underpricing between these
firms. Only examining GDP growth in the two periods can address its differential effects on the two types
of firms.
27The measure of the underwriter’s reputation is a discrete ranking taking values between 0 and 9 as described in Carter and
Manaster (1990).
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As we can see from Figures 6, the levels of both unemployment rate and annual returns on an investment
in S&P 500 are similar over the pre-repeal and post-repeal periods. However, the levels of the annual GDP
growth rate and the annual inflation rate in Figure 7 look quite different in the pre-repeal and post-repeal
periods, raising concern that these differences may affect IPO underpricing. To rule out this concern, I run
simple OLS regressions of average annual underpricing each year on annual GDP growth rate each year and
annual inflation each year respectively to see whether underpricing is affected by these two factors. The
results are shown in Table 7 and suggest that IPO underpricing is not related to GDP growth rate but is
correlated with the inflation rate. Thus, I add an interaction term of annual inflation and Treated as a control
variable in my regression. This does not change the results.
To further ensure that the pre-repeal and post-repeal periods in my sample are similar in terms of
economic conditions, I explore the economic background of the two periods. Both periods started in a
mild recession during the first two years, followed by a recovery period in the remaining years. During the
pre-repeal period of 1990-1997, the US economy entered into recession in July 1990; this recession lasted
8 months, through March 1991. The recession, which was mild relative to other post-war recessions, was
characterized by a sluggish employment recovery, most commonly referred to as jobless recovery. During
the post-repeal period of 2001-2006, many developed countries experienced recession of the early 2000s,
which was characterized by a decline in economic activity. This recession affected the US in 2002 and 2003;
similar to the previous recession in 1990-1991, it was relatively mild.28 Based on these similar economic
trajectories, I conclude that the pre-repeal and post-repeal periods are largely comparable.
4.5.7 Controlling for the Dot-Com Bubble
Although I have demonstrated the reasons for excluding the dot-com bubble from in my sample, concerns
may exist about this decision because, typically difference-in-differences regression designs do not include
gaps in their sample periods. To address this potential concern, I add 1998-2000 to the sample period as a
robustness check. There are a total of 2,966 firms in the sample including the dot-com bubble of 1998-2000.
Column (2) in Tables 4 and 5 shows that including the dot-com bubble period does not substantially
change the results. The key coefficient is still significantly negative, though its absolute value and signifi-
cance level are both lower.
28Some economists object to characterizing it as a recession since no two consecutive quarters experienced negative growth.
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5 Conclusion
Prior studies relating IPO underpricing to information asymmetry focus on a single level of asymmetry.
To the best of my knowledge, this is the first paper propose a fixable-mechanism underlying two levels of
information asymmetry.29
My theoretical model suggests that, given publicly observable transaction lending and no relationship
lending, investors may not be able to distinguish good firms from bad firms just by observing whether a firm
borrows. Even if the two types of firms can be separated, the bad firm suffers, receiving lower IPO proceeds
than it would in the pooling case. In contrast, when relationship lending is available and lending decisions
are confidential, IPO underpricing decreases and both types of firms benefit.
Empirical results confirm that relationship banking reduces the amount of uncertainty that the under-
writer and investors have about the true value of the firm and, thus, generates more accurate IPO prices.
I apply difference-in-differences and reduced form instrumental variable regression designs to a sample of
2,376 IPO firms, using variation in the strength of the lending relationship between IPO firms and their
underwriters generated by the repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act in 1999, which allowed commercial banks
with close ties to their client firms to underwrite those firms’ equity issuances. I show that, after the repeal
of the Glass–Steagall Act on November 12, 1999: (i) IPO underpricing drops by an average of 5.3% for all
firms; (ii) underpricing for the treated group falls by 6.5 more percentage points relative to the change in
the control group; and underpricing for treated firms with higher information uncertainty falls by 3.3 more
percentage points relative to the change in more transparent treated firms.
Under plausible assumptions, these estimates translate into substantial economic effects. For example,
if we assume that average IPO underpricing is 16.8%, then calculations suggest that firms can receive an
additional $2 billion per year on average to reinvest and grow.
29The information asymmetry between the firm and underwriter and the information asymmetry between the firm and investors.
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Figure 1: Average IPO Underpricing (units in %)
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Figure 2: IPO proceeds/assets (units in millions)
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Figure 3: IPO Shares Offered (units in millions)
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Figure 4: Tobin’s Q
32
Figure 5: LnAssets (units in ln millions)
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Figure 6: Unemployment Rate in US and Annual Returns on Investment in S&P 500
Source: United States Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics & Federal Reserve Database in St.
Louis
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Figure 7: Annual GDP Growth Rate and Annual Inflation in US
Source: World Bank & Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis
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Figure 8: Channel of Relationship Banking’s Effect on IPO Underpricing
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Table 1: Summary statistics for the control variables
Panel A reports summary statistics for independent variables in the regression. Panel B reports the results
of univariate tests. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels is denoted by *, ** and ***,
respectively. The t-statistics are in parentheses.
Panel A: Summary statistics
Percentile Distribution
N Mean S.D. 25th Median 75th
IPOproceeds_assets 56,322 1.575 5.774 0.184 0.514 1.042
TobinQ 55,834 2.031 5.875 0.522 0.987 1.634
lnRealAge 63,035 3.505 0.565 3.135 3.401 3.784
lnIPO_sharesoffered 63,035 15.639 0.996 14.878 15.499 16.278
preIPOlnassets 56,322 5.292 2.224 3.820 5.479 6.666
preIPOcash_assets 56,194 0.098 0.147 0.015 0.040 0.111
secondaryshares_percent 55,179 0.073 0.160 0.000 0.000 0.097
Panel B: Univariate analysis
Post = 0 Post = 1
Treated = 1 Treated = 0 (1) Treated = 1 Treated = 0 (2)
Mean Mean Diff Mean Mean Diff
TobinQ 1.0698 2.7509 -1.681*** 1.3879 1.602 -0.214***
(-23.30) (-4.37)
lnRealAge 3.6193 3.5148 0.104*** 3.2796 3.4418 -0.162***
(21.65) (-13.41)
InternetIPO 0.0017 0.0121 -0.0104*** 0.0059 0.1583 -0.152***
(-5.14) (-7.49)
lnIPO_sharesoffered 15.5265 15.2569 0.270*** 16.4945 16.4826 0.0118
(31.97) (0.81)
VC 0.1004 0.2347 -0.134*** 0.0917 0.149 -0.0573***
(-34.31) (-10.39)
IPO_major_exchange 0.8992 0.9326 -0.0333*** 0.9838 0.9706 0.0132***
(-12.42) (5.16)
preIPOlnassets 6.1488 4.3882 1.761*** 6.4093 6.0357 0.374***
(75.32) (13.73)
preIPOcash_assets 0.0554 0.1071 -0.0517*** 0.0969 0.1273 -0.0304***
(-34.57) (-11.48)
secondaryshares_percent 0.0328 0.0531 -0.0203*** 0.2015 0.1207 0.0808***
(-17.04) (19.99)
N of observations 14,341 32,265 46,606 5,572 10,857 16,429
N of firms 235 1,552 1,787 144 445 589
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Table 2: : Summary statistics for the outcome variable
Panel A reports summary statistics for IPO_underpricing, the dependent variable in the regression. Panel B
reports the results of the univariate test. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels is denoted by
*, ** and ***, respectively. The t-statistics are in parentheses.
Panel A: Summary statistics
Percentile Distribution
N Mean S.D. 25th Median 75th
IPO_underpricing 62,473 9.886 15.113 0.000 5.000 14.875
Panel B: Univariate analysis
Post = 0 Post = 1
Treated = 1 Treated = 0 (1) Treated = 1 Treated = 0 (2)
Mean Mean Diff Mean Mean Diff
IPO_underpricing 6.6686 12.403 -5.735*** 0.275 11.559 -11.280***
(-35.95) (-64.16)
N of observations 14,341 32,265 46,606 5,572 10,857 16,429
N of firms 235 1,552 1,787 144 445 589
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Table 3: Empirical results for Prediction 1
This table reports results from the regressions relating firms’ IPO underpricing to relationship banking (Pre-
diction 1). The regression model is as follows:
Yi = β0+β1 ∗Post+ τXi+δk + εi
Xt is a vector of control variables. δk imply industry fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the firm
level. The appendix provides definitions for each variable. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1%
levels is denoted by *, ** and ***, respectively. The t-statistics are in parentheses.
Panel A
Dependent variable: IPO_underpricing
(treated and control firms) (treated firms only) (control firms only)
(1) (2) (3)
Post -5.316*** -10.215*** -2.553*
(-4.46) (-3.59) (-1.75)
Control variables Yes Yes Yes
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects No No No
Underwriter Characteristics No No No
N of firms 2,376 379 1,997
Adj R2 0.670 0.511 0.675
Panel B
Dependent variable: IPO_underpricing
(treated and control firms) (treated firms only) (control firms only)
(1) (2) (3)
Post -4.332** -8.587** -2.393*
(-2.22) (-2.31) (-1.72)
Control variables Yes Yes Yes
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects No No No
Underwriter Characteristics Yes Yes Yes
N of firms 2,376 379 1,997
Adj R2 0.771 0.580 0.750
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Table 4: Empirical results for Prediction 2
This table reports results from the regressions that relate to Prediction 2. The regression model is as follows:
Yi = β0+β1 ∗Treated ∗Post+β2 ∗Treated+ τXi+δk +δt + εi
Xt is a vector of control variables. δk and δt represent industry fixed effects and year fixed effects respec-
tively. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. The appendix provides definitions for each variable.
Statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels is denoted by *, ** and ***, respectively. The t-
statistics are in parentheses.
Panel A
Dependent variable: IPO_underpricing
(Excluding 1998-2000) (Including 1998-2000) (Matched sample)
(1) (2) (3)
Treated * Post -6.479*** -4.999** -6.252**
(-3.43) (-2.14) (-2.10)
Treated -4.128*** -4.517*** -5.273***
(-3.05) (-3.02) (-2.84)
Control variables Yes Yes Yes
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Underwriter Characteristics No No No
N of firms 2,376 2,966 1,087
Adj R2 0.679 0.679 0.548
Panel B
Dependent variable: IPO_underpricing
(Excluding 1998-2000) (Including 1998-2000) (Matched sample)
(1) (2) (3)
Treated * Post -6.278*** -4.867** -6.033**
(-3.67) (-2.25) (-2.20)
Treated -4.133*** -4.727*** -5.575***
(-3.25) (-3.22) (-2.97)
Control variables Yes Yes Yes
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Underwriter Characteristics Yes Yes Yes
N of firms 2,376 2,966 1,087
Adj R2 0.703 0.711 0.596
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Table 5: Empirical results for Prediction 3
This table reports results from the regressions that relate to Prediction 3. The regression model is as follows:
Yi = β0+β1 ∗ In f ormationAsymmetry∗Treated ∗Post+β2 ∗ In f ormationAsymmetry∗Treated
+β3 ∗ In f ormationAsymmetry∗Post+β4 ∗ In f ormationAsymmetry+β5 ∗Treated ∗Post
+β6 ∗Treated+ τXi+δk +δt + εi
InformationAsymmetry is proxied by Average_SD_sic. Xt is a vector of control variables. δk and δt represent
industry fixed effects and year fixed effects respectively. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. The
appendix provides definitions for each variable. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels is
denoted by *, ** and ***, respectively. The t-statistics are in parentheses.
Panel A
Dependent variable: IPO_underpricing
(Excluding 1998-2000) (Including 1998-2000) (Matched sample)
(1) (2) (3)
Average_SD_sic * Treated * Post -3.335** -2.035** -1.591**
(-2.41) (-2.40) (-2.02)
Average_SD_sic * Treated -1.776 -4.156** -4.835***
(-1.19) (-1.98) (-12.50)
average_SD_sic * Post 3.779*** 4.441*** 4.207***
(2.90) (3.66) (22.92)
Average_SD_sic 15.231*** 13.569*** 12.289**
(34.65) (24.80) (2.00)
Treated * Post -23.652*** -20.752*** -15.681***
(-5.91) (-4.93) (-9.22)
Treated -5.889 -4.936 -11.223***
(-0.69) (-0.39) (-8.30)
Control variables Yes Yes Yes
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Underwriter Characteristics No No No
N of firms 2,376 2,966 1,087
Adj R2 0.695 0.695 0.843
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Panel B
Dependent variable: IPO_underpricing
(Excluding 1998-2000) (Including 1998-2000) (Matched sample)
(1) (2) (3)
Average_SD_sic * Treated * Post -3.867** -2.445** -1.735**
(-2.31) (-2.24) (-2.32)
Average_SD_sic * Treated -1.972 -4.675** -4.998***
(-1.44) (-1.99) (-14.55)
average_SD_sic * Post 4.832*** 4.879*** 4.659***
(3.22) (3.78) (25.33)
Average_SD_sic 15.877*** 14.355*** 13.332**
(35.67) (25.88) (2.24)
Treated * Post -23.677*** -20.689*** -15.981***
(-6.96) (-4.98) (-9.56)
Treated -6.348 -5.665 -11.567***
(-0.78) (-0.45) (-8.96)
Control variables Yes Yes Yes
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Underwriter Characteristics Yes Yes Yes
N of firms 2,376 2,966 1,087
Adj R2 0.702 0.705 0.864
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Table 6: Univariate analysis for the control variables of matched sample
This table reports the results of univariate tests for the key control variables in the propensity score matched
sample. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels is denoted by *, ** and ***, respectively. The
t-statistics are in parentheses.
Post = 0 Post = 1
Treated = 1 Treated = 0 (1) Treated = 1 Treated = 0 (2)
Mean Mean Diff Mean Mean Diff
TobinQ 1.0797 1.4837 -0.404 1.3879 1.6036 -0.216
(-0.66) (-0.87)
lnIPO_sharesoffered 15.5086 15.3183 0.19 16.4941 16.2197 0.274
(1.13) (1.12)
preIPOlnassets 6.1369 5.2721 0.865 6.4093 5.8014 0.608
(0.96) (1.10)
N of firms 208 264 472 139 150 289
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Table 7: OLS regressions for Figure 7
This table reports results from the regressions relating firms’ IPO underpricing to macro-economic condi-
tions. The regression model is as follows:
Yi = β0+β1 ∗Xt + εi
Xt is a vector of two variables: Annual GDP growth rate and Annual inflation. Statistical significance at the
10%, 5% and 1% levels is denoted by *, ** and ***, respectively. The t-statistics are in parentheses.
Dependent variable: IPO_underpricing
(1) (2)
AnnualGDPGrowthRate -0.410
(-0.79)
AnnualInflation 1.083**
(2.17)
Control variables No No
Industry fixed effects No No
Year fixed effects No No
N 14 14
Adj R2 -0.039 0.270
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Table 8: Confirmation of the connection between the theoretical model and the empirical test
This table reports results from the regressions confirming the connection between the good and bad firms
as defined in the theoretical model and the treated and control firms as defined in the empirical part. The
regression model is as follows:
Yi = β0+β1 ∗Treated+ τXi+δk +δt + εi
Xt is a vector of control variables. δk and δt represent industry fixed effects and year fixed effects respec-
tively. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels
is denoted by *, ** and ***, respectively. The t-statistics are in parentheses.
Dependent variable: Average_SD_sic
Treated 5.88**
(1.99)
Control variables Yes
Industry fixed effects Yes
Year fixed effects Yes
N 2,367
Adj R2 0.660
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A Assumptions of the Model
1. Some underpricing is necessary to compensate uninformed investors for their anticipated losses on
overpriced issuances and to ensure their continued participation in the IPO market;
2. The degree of underpricing is directly related to the ex-ante uncertainty about the market value of the
firm;
3. There are two types of firms with the same expected value. The good firms, denoted by G, have a low
dispersion of market value; their offer proceeds, denoted by OPG, is high. The bad firms, denoted by
B, have a high dispersion of market value; their offer proceeds, denoted by OPB, is low. Firm owners
know their firm’s type, but not its market value;
4. Each firm has a project requring financing of D dollars (OPB < D < OPG). The project payoff repre-
sents the firm’s true market value;
5. Investors can’t discover a firm’s type without any cost. They only invest if the value of the firm
Vj ≥ OPj;
6. Underwriters are informed;
7. The distributions of possible market values for each type of firm are uniform: V˜G∼ U [aG,bG], V˜B
∼ U [aB,bB], where aG > aB, bG < bB. With relationship lending, V˜B could reach close to bB after
banks’ sector specialization improves project payoff;
8. Relationship lenders can participate in IPO as underwriters;
9. There are two types of banking relationships: (i) an underwriting relationship, where the relationship
bank underwrites the firm’s prior debt issuance (public debt placement); (ii) a lending relationship,
where the bank lends its own funds to the firm (term loans or revolver loans). Since the bank has a
financial stake in the lending relationship but not in the underwriting relationship, a relationship bank
has more incentives to monitor or screen firms, thus generating more information than is available in
an underwriting relationship.
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B Variable Definition
Variable Definition Source
Treated A dummy variable equal to one if the
IPO firm has a relationship bank at
least three years before IPO and zero
otherwise.
N/A
Post A dummy variable equal to one if the
IPO date is after the repeal of the
Glass–Steagall Act on November 12,
1999 and zero otherwise.
N/A
TobinQ The ratio of the firm’s market value of
common stock plus the book value of
preferred stock and debt, divided by its
total assets. This variable is
winsorized at 1 and 99 percent level
each year.
Compustat&Securities Data
Corporation (SDC) database
lnRealAge The natural logarithm of the number
of years since the firm was founded (or
since incorporation if founding date is
unavailable) to the date of the IPO.
www.site.warrington.ufl.edu
preIPOlnassets The natural logarithm of the total
assets of the firm in the pre-IPO year.
Compustat
PreIPOdebt_assets Calculated as total debt divided by
total assets in the firms’ pre-IPO year.
Compustat
preIPOcash_assets Calculated as total cash and short-term
investments divided by total assets in
the firms’ pre-IPO year.
Compustat
lnIPO_sharesoffered The natural logarithm of the number
of total shares offered in a firm’s IPO.
Securities Data Corporation
(SDC) database
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VC A dummy variable equal to one if the
firm is venture-backed pre-IPO, and
zero otherwise.
Securities Data Corporation
(SDC) database
IPOproceeds_assets The total proceeds from a firm’s IPO
divided by its assets in the pre-IPO
year.
Compustat&Securities Data
Corporation (SDC) database
secondaryshares_percent Calculated as secondary shares divided
by total shares offered in a firm’s IPO
Securities Data Corporation
(SDC) database
IPO_major_exchange A dummy variable equal to one if the
firm is listed either on NYSE or
Nasdaq, and zero otherwise.
Securities Data Corporation
(SDC) database
Internet_IPO A dummy variable equal to one if the
firm is an internet-related firm, and
zero otherwise.
www.site.warrington.ufl.edu
lnnumber_of_IPOs The total number of initial public
offerings in the firm’s IPO year.
www.quandl.com
Annual_inflation Calculated based on CPI from the
Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
www.minneapolisfed.org
Average_SD_sic The average standard deviation of
daily returns over the sample period
for all firms in the same industry as the
firm pursuing an IPO.
CRSP
IPO_underpricing Calculated as (Price at closing of 1st
trading day–Offer price)/Offer
price*100
Securities Data Corporation
(SDC) database
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